Magazine| Jan 19, 2009 26/11: us support Will The Eagle Help Hunt Our Prey? India looks to the US to get Pakistan to act and mulls its options if America does not do so for its own war on terror PRANAY SHARMA
Uncle Sam, Will You, Please...
Why is India seeking the help of the United States on Mumbai?
Not only is the US the lone superpower, it’s also the country with the maximum influence over Pakistan
New Delhi thinks that if the US is keen to avert an Indo-Pak conflict because of Afghanistan, Washington must persuade Islamabad to take substantive action against the perpetrators of Mumbai 26/11
New Delhi broke the domestic consensus on foreign policy to embrace the US. It feels it’s now America’s turn to provide comfort to India in its moment of grief.
What does India expect from America? Pakistan’s acceptance of Kasab isn’t enough. It wants Islamabad to hand over the Mumbai masterminds to India or the US. Or at least take an action that could allow the UPA to go to the polls without being defensive on the terror issue.
Can the US meet these expectations?
Its problem is that it can push Pakistan only up to a point. Wouldn’t want to do anything that could compromise Pakistan’s support in the war on terror in Afghanistan.
Therefore, it’s a tightrope walk for the US: avoid a Pak-India conflict, and yet enable the two countries to keep intact their national pride
If the US fails India, what are New Delhi’s options? India could start rolling back its diplomatic ties with Pakistan. To begin with, it could suspend the Indo-Pak composite dialogue. Depending on the mood in the public and the Congress party, the government could exercise an option strong enough for the party to go to elections thumping its chest.
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Truth mostly comes via a tortuous path in India-Pakistan relations. And even when it does—which is seldom—there is a heavy premium on it. Pakistan’s national security advisor Mahmud Ali Durrani realised this the hard way. He found himself summarily sacked for being the first in Islamabad to acknowledge that Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone terrorist of the Mumbai attack to be captured alive by the Indian police, is indeed a Pakistani national. The fury over his admission, with many dramatic twists and turns (see An Echo Chamber Drama), testifies to the existence of many "power centres" in Pakistan, all working at cross-purposes.
Durrani’s admission was touted as the "first big step", but his resignation promptly dashed hopes of a coordinated effort between India and Pakistan in the ongoing investigation to nail the perpetrators of the Mumbai horror. However, the squabbles in Pakistan don’t have the Indian foreign ministry worried. As a senior official said, "It’s not a question of being optimistic or pessimistic. We have our job cut out, we will do what we need to do."
Part of this "job" includes mounting international pressure to isolate Pakistan unless it cooperates in nailing and nabbing the Mumbai perpetrators. This was why Union external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee wrote to 184 of his counterparts worldwide, detailing Kasab’s confessions, the transcript of the conversation between the assailants and their Pakistani handlers and the details of other evidence such as the boat and GPS system the terrorists had used. In addition, the 131 heads of missions in Delhi were briefed about the ongoing investigations into the Mumbai attack and Pakistan’s role in it.
Some feel United States assistant secretary of state Richard Boucher’s presence in the subcontinent could have forced Pakistan to admit Kasab as its own. South Block officials, however, say it’s "too simplistic" to say Pakistan acted only because of Boucher.Before him, top US dignitaries—including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, John McCain and John Kerry—had been to Islamabad, mounting concerted efforts to have it cooperate with India. No less important was Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent statement accusing Pakistan of using terror as an instrument of foreign policy.
Talking tough: PM Manmohan Singh with his home minister and foreign minister
The Indian PM’s strong words had the international community, particularly the US, worried. Keen to avoid an Indo-Pak conflict lest it complicates their war in Afghanistan, the Americans thought Pakistan’s continued obduracy over the role of its citizens in Mumbai could compel New Delhi to take precipitous action to satisfy the public mood months before the general election. Adding to America’s fear was Mukherjee’s comment that war was not "exclusive, but inclusive" of all the options before India.
Mukherjee’s deliberate ambiguity about war is largely addressed to the US. Since Washington wants to avoid an Indo-Pak conflict, New Delhi expects it to mount pressure on Islamabad to act against terrorists operating from its soil. An Indian diplomat said, "There is expectation from the US, though it’s always difficult to quantify what we want." Obviously, the best-case scenario is to have Pakistan deliver the Mumbai masterminds—for instance, Lashkar operations chief Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi (see LeT it be Known: This is Lakhvi)— to India. At the very least, officials feel, Pakistan must acquiesce to a point where the Congress and its allies can thump their chests to the polls.
Ironically, Delhi’s tough talk has raised public expectations about Pakistan’s acquiescence. These expectations have willy-nilly become linked to the belief that America would intercede on India’s behalf. Over the last eight years, the Indian leadership—both under the BJP and the Congress—has proffered every argument to justify its decision to inch closer to the US. The Congress even ignored the Left’s objections and imperiled its government to secure the Indo-US deal. The UPA consequently feels it is now America’s turn to return the favour by deploying its formidable clout over Pakistan and wielding the big stick to compel it to fall in line. Otherwise, the fears are that public support for India’s growing proximity to the US would shrink.
Former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal told Outlook, "The government is expected to show some action on some front. That’s why the US role has become important." Ironically again, expectations from America have been raised because it surmounted all opposition to secure the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver for India last year. Agrees Sibal, "Since the US played the cardinal role in riding over all opposition to see the nuclear deal through, it has fanned hopes in India."
But government officials are busy doing a reality check, wondering to what extent Indo-US relations can be milked. As a key prime ministerial aide argues, "Can we say that no such attack would have taken place if we had not entered into a strategic partnership with the US?" He says relations with the US have grown dramatically, pointing out that not only has its FBI furnished vital assistance in the Mumbai investigations, but also described the evidence India collected as "credible". However, though it has mounted pressure on Pakistan, he says, there are limits to what can be achieved through Washington. "It’s wrong to expect the US to pull out the Indian chestnuts from the fire," the prime ministerial aide said.
Agrees former foreign minister and BJP leader Yashwant Sinha, "The US will go up to a point in pressuring Pakistan, but not beyond it." He feels the US can at best help India bag a "consolation prize"—bans on a few terrorist groups and arrests of their leaders in Pakistan.
But then, America has its own compulsions. It doesn’t want to jeopardise its war in Afghanistan, particularly as Barack Obama is only a fortnight away from taking the reins from George W. Bush. Obama wants to pursue a "surge policy" of deploying more troops in Afghanistan to win its war against terror. Such a policy will only enhance Pakistan’s importance to the US. Says the prime ministerial aide, "The US will ratchet up pressure but not to the extent where the Pakistani turns against American interests in Afghanistan." Agrees former Indian ambassador to the US, Naresh Chandra, "The Obama presidency is unlikely to do anything that will jeopardise its surge policy."
Even as the Indian establishment assesses what America can provide, New Delhi is mulling over ways in which it can continue to mount pressure on Pakistan. Several steps have been suggested. Sinha feels the government should despatch leaders of different political parties to various world capitals to mobilise international opinion, as Indira Gandhi had done during the East Pakistan crisis of 1971. "It will clearly demonstrate that there is national consensus on demanding justice against the perpetrators of Mumbai," Sinha said.
Chandra thinks India should work closely with a number of countries, particularly China and those in the Gulf, to isolate Pakistan, and campaign vigorously in the US, particularly among the members of US Congress. Perhaps this could help stall the $14-billion package for Pakistan that the US Congress will take up in the coming weeks. Part of this package is for military assistance.
Should nothing substantial come out of these efforts, what can India do? For one, there’s a growing demand in the Congress for a response in the couple of months before the general elections. As such, New Delhi has a limited time-frame—till February-end before the election process unfolds. Many in the party endorse Sibal’s suggestion. He told Outlook, "We can call off the composite dialogue and the peace process," adding that India should soon start rolling back its diplomatic ties with Islamabad.
For, if the Congress fails to wrest major concessions from Pakistan, the Opposition is likely to launch a nationwide campaign against the UPA for its failure to deal effectively with the Mumbai crisis. This fear of the UPA’s has prompted New Delhi to believe that Pakistan, under Washington’s pressure, could hand over the Mumbai masterminds to the US, which had six of its citizens among the dead in the Mumbai carnage. Otherwise, officials feel, the UPA may opt for a harsher option to ensure that it isn’t seen as a weakling in the months before a fresh mandate is sought from the people. In may ways the growing shrillness of its pitch could well define the government’s goals and the paths it will take.
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 Terror Colours, In Black & White
Outlook accesses the dossier India has sent to Pakistan and its unabridged version that proves the Pakistani link
All along in denial, Pakistan blinked for the first time and admitted that Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone terrorist nabbed by the Mumbai police, was indeed from Pakistan. The admission came on January 7, 48 hours after India presented a 69-page dossier with damning evidence to the Pakistani high commissioner in Delhi and the foreign secretary in Islamabad. Simultaneously, Indian foreign secretary Shiv Shankar Menon gave an even more detailed 180-page dossier and a special presentation to 14 ambassadors of countries—including the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Singapore and China—whose citizens had died in the 26/11 terror attack.
Outlook has accessed both dossiers and details of the foreign secretary’s presentation. Packed in them is clear evidence of the Pakistani link. Weapons used had Pakistani markings. Food and clothing worn by the terrorists were procured in Karachi. Soaps and detergent used were traced back to specific shops in Pakistan. The Yamaha outboard motor used during the sea journey was sold by a Pakistan distributor. Also included in the evidence were crucial phone intercepts by Indian intelligence.
This, then, is the picture that emerges of how 26/11 was planned and executed:
The Training In his presentation of January 5, Shiv Shankar Menon provided the following details. The Lashkar-e-Toiba initially trained 32 men for the Mumbai attack. Of these, 13 were shortlisted following a rigorous selection procedure. Six were then sent away to a still unknown destination and three new members joined, taking the group’s membership to 10. Among the new faces was Ismail Khan, who led the assault.
Thuraya satphone: Recovered from MV Kuber along with a card
The Planning Investigators say planning began a year ago. The mastermind, they say, was Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, aka Chachaji or Chachu, now identified as the "supreme commander" of the LeT’s strikes. He is believed to have served in Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq and Southeast Asia. Suspected to be a former Pakistani army commando, Lakhvi has been branded an international terrorist by the United Nations and is a Pakistani national (national identity card no. 61101-9618232). His role in the Mumbai attacks was confirmed by Kasab during interrogation. It was Lakhvi who planned and executed the plot with his operations chief, Yusuf Muzammil. They procured several VoIP accounts for internet telephony as well as Indian and Austrian numbers to maintain contact with those executing the strike.
9 mm pistol from the Diamond Nedi Frontier Arms Company, Peshawar: Recovered from various terror spots in Mumbai
Passage To Mumbai The group of 10 left Karachi by boat at 8 am on November 22. Forty minutes later, they boarded Al Hussaini, a vessel manned by seven LeT cadres. The following day, at 3 pm, the terrorists took over the Gujarati fishing boat, the MV Kuber, about 540 nautical miles (NM) from the Mumbai coast. Four crew members of the Kuber were killed. Only the vessel’s captain Amarsinh Solanki was allowed to live.
Between November 22 and November 26, the Kuber maintained a distance of 60-80 NM from the Indian coast. The terrorists then plotted their way using four reference points referred to as JALA 1, 2, 3 and 4.Of these, the last two—JALA 3 was 4 NM off the Mumbai coast while the last reference point, JALA 4, was Budhwar Park where the terrorists landed.
En route, the terrorists were in touch with their handlers via a Thuraya satellite phone (+8821655526412) using a code language. Indian intelligence has cracked the code. Here is a sampling:
Code:Machhli lag rahi hai (The fish is taking the bait).
Decoded: The journey so far has been uneventful/safe.
Bhai log: This is how terrorists referred to fishing vessels sighted along the way. One such vessel, the MV Maa, tried to hail them unsuccessfully.
Yaar Log (friends): Indian naval boats.
Yaar Logon ka group (Group of Friends): Indian navy ship.
Machine: Trouble.
Maal (Goods): Help
Baraf (Ice): Journey
The Attack The last four nautical miles to the Mumbai shore was covered in a dinghy—after the Kuber was abandoned and its captain killed. The terrorists landed at Budhwar Park and split into five groups of two men each. Each of the men had packs of 300 rounds of ammunition, several AK-47 magazines, one assault rifle, two 9 mm pistols, grenades and dry fruits. Each team had one hand-held GPS to lead them to their final destinations—the Taj and Oberoi hotels and Nariman House. Two groups went to the CST railway station and Leopold Cafe to later hook up with the other teams at the hotels and Nariman House.
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 "Kill All, Keep Fighting..."
Excerpts from the intercepts of phone calls received by the terrorists from their Pakistani handlers...
Investigators have pieced together the details of the attack on Mumbai from the intercepts of the phone calls received by the terrorists from their Pakistani handlers during the 60 hours that they battled the navy and NSG commandos. Excerpts:
Taj Hotel: November 27, 0108 hours
Handler Wassi speaking to terrorist Ali
Wassi:How many hostages?
Ali: One Belgian. We killed him. One from Bangalore, who had to be controlled with great effort.
Wassi: I hope there were no Muslims.
Ali: None.
Next call, 0126 hours
Wassi: Are you setting fire to the hotel?
Ali: Not yet. We are piling up the mattresses to light the fire.
Wassi: Did you dispose of the body (of the Kuber captain)?
Ali: No. We made a big mistake.
Wassi: What big mistake?
Ali: We forgot to open the cocks of the boat (to sink it). There were huge waves and we thought a navy ship was approaching us so we forgot Ismail’s satellite phone behind!
Wassi: The media is saying the ATC chief (ATS chief Hemant Karkare) has been killed. There is also a vazir (minister) there. Don’t let him escape.
Ali: We have set fire to the rooms.
Wassi: People should run helter skelter...and keep throwing grenades at them every 15 minutes.
0310 hours
Wassi: Three vazirs and one secretary of cabinet (a reference to Maharashtra additional chief secretary Chitkala Zutshi) are in your hotel.
Ali: That is great news!
Wassi: Get them and Hindustan will be forced to accept whatever you demand. Do one thing. Throw one or two grenades at the navy commandos.
Ali: We can’t make out who they are...
Oberoi-Trident Hotel: November 27, 0353 hrs
Call from Pakistani handler Zarar Shah to terrorists Abdul and Fahad:
Zarar: Brother Abdul, the media is comparing your action to America’s 9/11.
Adbul: (Confused) We are on 10th and 11th floors
Zarar: Kill all. Keep fighting. Don’t take any hostages alive.
Farhad: Three foreigners have been killed, one was from Singapore and the other from China!
Zarar: Kill all! Let’s hear the gunfire, so keep the phone switched on (the terrorists are heard asking the hostages to stand in a line. Sound of firing followed by cheering.)
Nariman House: November 27, 19.45 hrs
Call to terrorists from handlers Abu Kaafha and Wassi:
Abu: Did you speak to Major General (another handler). What did he say?
Imran: The major general said we could do whatever we liked and that the operation could be concluded tomorrow. He asked us to keep two AK magazines and three grenades and use the rest.
Wassi: Hostages are useful as long as you are not under fire. Kill them and don’t saddle yourself with them. The (Indian) army claims to have saved all the hostages. Israel has also offered through diplomatic channels to help India in the rescue of the hostages. So kill all. It will spoil (India’s) relations with Israel,
Terrorist: Inshallah.
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 Who Says This Is A Litmus Test?
Bilateral ties don't matter as much to US as terror per se
United States officials privately acknowledge that India is justified in expecting Washington to play a constructive role in securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the Mumbai terror investigation. "I don’t think it is an unfair expectation," a Bush administration official told Outlook, speaking on condition of anonymity. "The attack on Mumbai was a grievous one in which the US also lost its citizens. We have a sense of the depth of emotion on this issue in India. We would be fooling ourselves if we thought that India did not expect us to play a constructive role."
With US-Indo relations scaling dizzy heights on President George W. Bush’s watch—symbolised by the groundbreaking nuclear deal—the official acknowledged that "many Indians will be looking at this issue (Mumbai probe) as an indicator of what this relationship can become". Admitting that there is enough evidence linking the Mumbai terrorists to Pakistan, the official said, "Pakistan now has to accept that and make some very difficult decisions." However, he thought, it was premature to believe that the Pakistani government was culpable in Mumbai, as Prime Minster Manmohan Singh had indicated in his recent remarks.
What can Washington do to meet India’s expectations? State Department spokesman Gregory Sullivan told Outlook, "Obviously, Pakistan and India have had troubled relations. We know shifting toward a posture of cooperation and sharing information isn’t going to be easy. It will not happen overnight." The US could take the role of facilitator, Sullivan said. "In the Mumbai investigation," he went on to add, "Pakistan has some pieces of the puzzle and India has some. Both sides need to sit down and put all the pieces on the table."
K. Alan Kronstadt, a specialist in South Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service, says that besides bringing intense diplomatic pressure on Islamabad, Washington could make cooperation in specific terrorism investigations a prerequisite for future US assistance to Pakistan. The Bush Administration opposed the imposition of overt conditions on US aid to Pakistan, but Kronstadt speculated that as president, Barack Obama may opt for this linkage.
A former Clinton Administration official, however, speaking on condition that he not be named, said suggestions that the current crisis in the subcontinent will serve as a "litmus test" for US-India relations is "old-think language. I don’t think our bilateral relations need to be put to the test by any one issue, whether it is Pakistan, Iran or anything else". Be that as it may, Washington clearly hopes to provide India some comfort on Mumbai.
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 LeT It Be Known: This Is Lakhvi
Passion for jehad has defined the life of Lashkar-e-Toiba operations chief
Passion for jehad has defined the life of Lashkar-e-Toiba operations chief Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, who has been accused of training the terrorists responsible for the Mumbai carnage. Such is Lakhvi’s commitment to the cause that he sent his 20-year-old son Mohammad Qasim to wage jehad in Kashmir. A year later, in October 2007, Qasim was gunned down.
Born on December 30, 1960, Lakhvi’s stock in the shadowy world of jehad zoomed when his sister got married to Abu Abdur Rahman Sareehi, a Saudi who was counted among Osama bin Laden’s trusted lieutenants. In 1988, Sareehi established Lashkar training camps in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Paktia provinces; Lakhvi was among the top trainers there. Perhaps his clout in the Lashkar was also enhanced because of the Rs 10 million Sareehi donated for building the Lashkar’s Muridke headquarters, from where the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) now operates.
Lashkar’s participation in the Afghan jehad enabled both its founder, Prof Hazid Mohammad Saeed, and Lakhvi to endear themselves to the Pakistan intelligence establishment. The two were persuaded to deploy their foot-soldiers in Kashmir, following the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989. Lakhvi was made the Lashkar’s operations chief in Kashmir, where the militant outfit was soon to court infamy.
The December 13, 2001, attack on Parliament prompted a ban on the Lashkar. Saeed resigned as LeT chief to establish JuD and appointed Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri as his successor. Lakhvi was retained as LeT’s operations commander. Yet he turned against Saeed, ostensibly because he believed that the JuD had been floated to corner the massive funds collected for jehad in Kashmir. But those close to Lakhvi say he fell out with Saeed because of his decision to marry, at the age of 64, a 28-year-old widow whose husband had died fighting in Kashmir. Whatever the reason, Lakhvi was provoked into floating his own group, the Khair-un-Naas (KuN), whose fighters used to take an oath to assassinate Saeed. A year on, minders in the Pak intelligence establishment brokered truce between them. The rest, as they say, is history.
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 An Echo Chamber Drama
Is Kasab Pakistani? And so started an absurd play on television.
From the very beginning, the horror of Mumbai has been a TV show, where the world saw the terrorists lay siege to spiffy hotels and kill innocents. It was TV that played out many aspects of security operations. And it was on TV that India and Pakistan began their war of words that culminated in the spectacle of January 7 evening—of different Pakistani institutions speaking in contradictory voices, underlining the growing rift between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. Islamabad alternated between accepting Ajmal Kasab, the lone Mumbai terrorist to have survived, as its citizen and denying it and then, after hours of confusion, admitted he was indeed a Pakistani national. This was followed by the summary dismissal of national security advisor Mahmud Ali Durrani.
All hell broke loose as soon as the Dawn TV network quoted a "high-ranking official" to declare: "Sadly, it has been established that Kasab is a Pakistani citizen. He’s the son of Amir Kasab and Mrs Noor Illahi of Faridkot." The official wasn’t named, but an Indian TV channel got into the act, saying it was none other than Durrani who had provided the confirmation in their interviews with him. (The NSA was to later claim he had only said that "Kasab could be a Pakistani national.")
Singing another tune on Kasab’s nationality was foreign secretary Salman Bashir. "Not so," he responded. "Investigations are still continuing and it would be premature to state anything at this time." From Kabul, Pak foreign ministry spokesperson Mohammad Sadiq added, "We are still investigating and cannot confirm." And then came the breaking news on the state-owned TV—information minister Sherry Rehman’s SMS to a news agency confirming Kasab’s Pakistani nationality. You thought this was it.
Zardari (left) with PM Yousuf Gilani
But the TV show took another weird turn. The president reportedly learnt only from TV that his PM had sacked Durrani as NSA. Durrani is close to Zardari, who had pulled him out from Washington, where he had been sent as Pakistan’s envoy by the Musharraf regime. To rub salt in the wounds, Gilani told Geo TV, "My NSA has embarrassed me. I wasn’t taken into confidence (about Durrani’s admission) so I have dismissed him with immediate effect."
This was indeed an eye for an eye. The security establishment had seemingly forwarded a file to the prime minister’s office confirming Kasab’s Pakistani identity, a rarity in South Asia where inconvenient truths are often fudged. Gilani had been fashioning a strategy to break this news, hoping to leverage this to Pakistan’s advantage and earning a pat for himself. Obviously, Zardari’s men beat him to it, yet another indicator of the simmering discontent between the president and the PM. Perhaps, from now Zardari would have another power centre, apart from the army, to contend with.
Before this madness unfolded on TV, ISI chief Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha created a stir through an interview to a German publication. Speaking about the possibility of Pakistan going to war against India, Pasha had said, "We may be crazy in Pakistan, but not completely out of our minds." The newpapers reporting the January 7 drama rephrased Pasha’s comment thus: "We are crazy in Pakistan and completely out of our minds."
The only voice of sanity came from Opposition leader Mushahid Hussain, who welcomed Pakistan accepting Kasab as its own. "This is a positive step," he said. "Pakistan has done the right thing by telling the truth." Pakistan’s acceptance of a terrorist nabbed in India as its citizen is unprecedented. This, though, raises the question: Will this inaugurate an era of serious crackdown on militant organisations?
There are whispers in army circles that the generals might be willing to act against their proxies (read the Lashkar) if India provides a quid pro quo in Kashmir. Also, some in the security establishment say they have made progress in their probe into the origins of the Mumbai attack, and feel that India should accept joint investigations aimed at piecing together all the clues.
Analysts, however, feel New Delhi is only interested in extradition of those who it believes masterminded the attacks. But Ahmed Bilal Soofi, an expert on international law, says, "There is no legal obligation for Pakistan either under SAARC or UN conventions or its own law to hand over any Pakistani national to India. It can only be done if the government so desires and shows some political will." The SAARC convention isn’t binding and, more importantly, subject to the laws of a SAARC country to which requests for extradition are made.
Otherwise too, no Pakistani government can survive extradition of its citizens wanted in India. "Can you as a Pakistani even think of such an action?" asked a serving general. Gen (retd) Rashid Qureshi, a former aide of Musharraf, feels India played its card poorly: "Without completing its own investigations, India sent its planes into our airspace and issued other threats. Which government in its right mind would oblige after such provocation?" Adds Opposition MP and columnist Ayaz Amir, "Even if the army, for the sake of argument, agrees to extradition, the brigadier and lower rank officers would take it very hard. This is also a deeply unpopular government. India should do the doable. Is it really serious about extradition? Or does it just want to weaken Pakistan?" And so the war of words continues.
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 The Gates Are Open
The ban on the JuD has been a farce. It's business as usual.
Free For All
UN resolution 1267 imposed sanctions on the JuD, requiring that activists be disarmed. At the JuD HQ, though, gun-toting men move about.
The JuD took out a public rally in December, protesting against the UN ban. A police convoy accompanied it.
The outfit’s websites have been closed. But Urdu publication Ghazva continues to be printed, spitting venom against India, Israel, the US.
JuD spokesman Abdullah Muntazir’s statement of Jan 6 threatened the government with dire consequences. The FBI says Muntazir impersonates as the Srinagar-based LeT spokesman.
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You are obviously aware of the Pakistan government’s ban on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against it. So your feeling is that JuD activists must have gone underground, shuddering at the sight of men in uniform. Well, not so fast. Drive down to Muridke, 30 km from Lahore, where the JuD’s sprawling 200-acre headquarters, called Markaz-e-Toiba, is located. Atop its main building flutters the JuD’s black-and-white flag, in defiance of the ban imposed on it. Symbolic, you think, nothing to worry about.
Outside the Markaz, dozens of gun-toting JuD activists stand guard, belying claims that it’s only an educational and medical centre (it houses several schools, colleges and a hospital). The Markaz bustles with activity, and there isn’t a policeman either inside or outside the complex. Away from Muridke, the JuD still continues to run—without any restrictions—its 150 healthcare centres, 10 hospitals, 300 schools and 510 madrassas countrywide.
It was in the second week of December that the government launched a crackdown on the JuD, detaining among others its chief Prof Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and Lashkar operations chief Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. A month later, the crackdown appears to have come to a halt. In fact, three days after Saeed was placed under house arrest, he was allowed to leave his Johar Town residence in Lahore to offer Friday prayers in a nearby mosque. And though his movement has been restricted now, he hasn’t yet been chargesheeted and is free to see his colleagues.
His son Talha Saeed faces even less restrictions, regularly leading the Friday prayers at Lahore’s Jamia Qadsia mosque, touted as the second JuD headquarters. True to his father’s teachings, Talha continues to spit venom against India, the United States and Israel.
A JuD spokesman, Atiq-ur Rehman, addressing the media after their office was sealed
Not only this, three days after the UNSC sanctions against the JuD, its activists organised a rally in Lahore on December 14. The protest against the UN was led by Yahya Mujahid, JuD’s central secretary, information, and one of the 12 leaders whom the Pakistan government had put under house arrest. Hundreds of JuD activists in over 50 vehicles, including JuD ambulances, drove from Nasir Bagh to the Lahore Press Club, via the Mall, carrying banners and placards. Escorting them was a contingent of the Punjab police.
The JuD continues to use print and electronic media for propaganda purposes, in gross violation of government orders. For instance, JuD spokesperson Abdullah Muntazir issued a statement as recently as January 6, threatening the government with dire consequences should it decide to act against the JuD. Incidentally, the American fbi is believed to have identified Muntazir as the person who impersonates as the Srinagar-based Lashkar-e-Toiba spokesperson Abdullah Ghaznavi. The fbi has reportedly told Islamabad that Muntazir has adopted this ruse—ringing up journalists from masked numbers—because of the JuD’s official stance that it has severed links with the LeT, once it shifted base to Srinagar.
The only concrete action taken against the JuD so far has been the shutting down of its Urdu and English websites by the Cyber Crime Wing of the Federal Investigation Agency. However, the JuD’s Urdu-language weekly, Ghazva, continues to hit the newsstands, featuring hate material. Ghazva treated the Mumbai attacks as its lead story, describing the gory incident as "a historic victory for the Muslim warriors who had actually avenged the grave atrocities being committed by the Indian establishment against the Muslim minority in several parts of India and in the state of Jammu & Kashmir". In the same issue, Ghazva claimed that over 4,500 Pakistani mothers donated one son each and 83 mothers two sons each to the JuD this year. Their goal: promoting, preaching and defending Islam, besides waging jehad against the forces of the infidel.
After all this, the Pakistan government, as is required by UNSC resolution No. 1267, has not even confiscated the weapons, even those licensed, from JuD activists. On January 4, information minister Sherry Rehman said it is the Punjab government’s responsibility to enforce the ban. In response, the provincial government spokesman Pervaiz Rashid pointed out that five JuD leaders have been put under arrest. "Necessary measures are also being taken for assuming control of the central headquarters of Jamaat-ud-Dawa at Muridke," he added. The most interesting comment, though, came from federal interior minister Rehman Malik: "If they are running schools and hospitals, what can we do? We are not in a position to shut down medical centres and schools and colleges being run by the JuD." There are a few voices that say, well, take them over then.
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 Should India Carry Out Surgical Strikes In Pak?
Hamas, LeT, they are the same. India has to make the ultimate choice.
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the crisis in Gaza is that it was so easily avoidable. The six-month truce brokered by Egypt was nearing its end and Israel had reiterated its readiness to extend it. The response from Hamas was an unambiguous refusal, and two days before the truce ended, it renewed bombardment of southern Israeli villages and towns. Over the past six years, more than 30,000 missiles have rained down on Israeli civilians from Gaza. In 2008 alone, there were over 2,950 such attacks. These continued unabated even through the truce.
Israel tried everything possible to end this constant barrage. It left Gaza of its own volition in 2005, introduced economic inducements to assist institution-building in Gaza, used the good offices of foreign states to impress upon Hamas to cease targeting civilians and tried to reach a long-term truce. All attempts were refuted. The time comes, sadly, that when all efforts to bring security fail, the only recourse possible, after years of restraint, is the military option. The primary duty and obligation of any government is the security of its citizens—and Israel is no exception. No government can stand idly by when half a million of its civilians are permanently forced to reside 15 seconds away from a bomb shelter.
Israel isn’t the enemy of the Palestinian people. They are our neighbours and we ardently desire to live in peace and harmony with them. Hamas has brought this crisis on itself, consciously choosing terror over coexistence, extremism over moderation. Part of the Iranian-Hezbollah terror axis, Hamas is a violent and extremist Islamist organisation and is recognised as such by the European Union, the United States and, in fact, around the globe. Its adherence to an extremist religious doctrine, its total unwillingness to compromise and its avowed aim to eliminate the state of Israel are enshrined in its own manifesto, which actually calls for the murder of Jews, not just Israelis. It has blown up buses with their passengers, and sent suicide bombers to kill Israelis in discotheques, shopping malls and synagogues.
True, use of military force must always be the very last resort, and is clearly never an end in itself. Israel’s sole objective is the permanent cessation of the reign of terror that Hamas has wreaked on innocent Israelis. Allegations of lack of proportionality are unfounded. Indeed, by the principle of proportionality, what if Israel had been compelled to fire over 30,000 rockets into Gaza, even crude ones, to compensate for the numbers fired at it? Wouldn’t that have had shocking repercussions? Israeli forces are making every effort to prevent collateral damage despite Hamas placing themselves in the heart of civilian populations, in hospitals, mosques and schools. The death of any civilian is truly a tragedy, yet by all accounts the overwhelming majority of the casualties are Hamas extremists.
Comparison has been made of the Israel-Hamas situation and India’s struggle to rid itself of extremist terror, which the Mumbai atrocities so vividly symbolised. Indeed, comparisons between Hamas and the Lashkar-e-Toiba are valid; both are terror organisations dedicated to the slaughter of innocents to achieve extremist political objectives. However, each and every situation has its own characteristics, timelines and possible systems of response. No two situations are identical. While Israel stands solidly behind India’s efforts to rid itself of terror emanating from abroad, the Indian government will make its own decisions as to how best to achieve its aims. Israel was forced into making the ultimate choice—of using the military option.
Hamas could have used the truce period to build schools, hospitals and welfare institutions in Gaza.Instead, they squandered millions on weaponry. If they thought Israel would succumb, they were sorely mistaken. Now the strategic equation must change. The moment Israel is certain Hamas will never launch further attacks, the military confrontation will end. And when there is a complete stoppage of Hamas terror, Israel, the Palestinian leadership and the Arab and wider international community can reapply themselves to building real peace in West Asia. This is attainable sooner than many think. The principled agreement of two states, Israel and Palestine, to live side by side in peace, security and respect isn’t a pipe-dream but a reality. The weakening influence of Hamas may well contribute to building a future of peace, hope and accommodation between two peoples who have for so long been locked in conflict.
(Mark Sofer is Israel’s ambassador to India.)
magazine | Jan 19, 2009 Should India Carry Out Surgical Strikes In Pak?
Israel's situation is different. We need solutions that make Indians safer.
After the Mumbai attacks, many people have said that India should follow Israel’s example and launch military strikes against the militants in Pakistan. I have no doubt our army enjoys conventional superiority over the Pakistani army, but such ideas ignore deep differences between Israel and India. And, more importantly, such ideas tend to confuse the myth of Israel’s success with the real results of its actions.
The similarities between our positions are deceptive. We are battling terrorists; the Israelis are battling those they call terrorists. Both their opponents and ours are armed and trained with the help of external actors. This is where the similarities end. Israel faces an existential crisis and has been, since the moment it was created, surrounded by hostile Arab states. It has an unwilling Palestinian population under its control. Adding to the fears such a situation creates is the memory of the Holocaust. We have no such fears. India is a large country—basically indestructible. The most that terrorists can do is bleed us. The second big difference is that Israel is dealing with groups based in territories under its control; most groups that attack us are based outside India.
More importantly, the idea that Israelis are masters at carrying out such missions is a myth. Two famous missions created this myth: the surgical strike against the Osirak nuclear installation, which stunted Iraq’s ability to create N-weapons; and the commando operation at Entebbe in Uganda, during which Israelis were freed from a hijacked plane with a minimum loss of life. These created the impression that Israel could inflict damage upon its enemies without being touched, but since then the myth has diverged from the reality. Two years ago, Israel marched into Lebanon thinking they would destroy the Hezbollah but ended up retreating in disgrace. And now, in Gaza, for all their claims of attacking only Hamas—a terrorist organisation and a legitimate target—Israel has attacked a civilian population and even bombed a UN school. Such atrocities against innocent civilians are turning even their closest friends against them.
This is not an example we should follow. What has Israel achieved with attacks on the Palestinians? The moderates have been sidelined, the extremists have been encouraged and after a history of 60 years of military actions against the Palestinians, Israelis still live in an atmosphere of fear for their very existence. If this were to happen to Pakistan after military action taken by India, we will confront a failed state and a Talibanised neighbour. There will be no prospect of durable peace in the foreseeable future.
The real enemy is the isi and the terrorist groups that continue to receive military backing. They need to be isolated from the larger Pakistani nation. During the last five years, following the composite dialogue process, a constituency in Pakistan has risen demanding just this. Many Pakistanis have begun to question whether 60 years of hostility towards India have led to anything other than their nation sinking deeper while India has forged ahead. This constituency has to expand if we are to see the prospect of Pakistan becoming a stable democratic nation, one that stops exporting terrorism. There is no reason to destroy the real achievements of the last few years by ill-considered military actions that will only strengthen the hands of our enemies.
Besides, there isn’t any empirical evidence that surgical strikes work in stopping terrorists. In this case, a military strike would give the Pakistani army an excuse to silence its critics and even overwhelm or oust the civilian government. We might end up driving Pakistan into the hands of the militants, giving them much greater power to threaten us.Above all, there is the ultimate threat of nuclear war. That always has to be taken into account in our calculations.
Lastly, we need to realise that diplomacy alone, coercive or otherwise, can never solve the problem of terrorism; 80 per cent of the solution is internal to India. We didn’t have, and don’t have, the laws, the police force or the intelligence to deal with the issue. The US, at least in this regard, offers a precedent, with its Department of Homeland Security. In contrast, we have a home ministry that looks after security, the national language, and even the Padma awards! We need to pursue solutions that make every Indian safer, not just follow the example of a country that faces a situation starkly different from ours.
(Lalit Mansingh is a former foreign secretary.) as told to Omair Ahmad